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Abstract
Buybacks of fishing vessels, licences, access and other rights, and gear, sometimes
called decommissioning schemes, have traditionally been a key policy tool to address
overcapacity, overexploitation of fish stocks, and distributional issues in fisheries. Two
more issues can be added, sustainable use of ecosystems and conservation of
biodiversity (i.e. ecological public goods and services) and providing a transition to a
more rationalized fishery. This study discusses reasons for buybacks; examines
consequences; considers asymmetric information, design of buyback auctions and
other design issues; buybacks as a transition to a rationalized industry with strong
property rights and governance, financing and transnational fisheries; draws out key
lessons from the international experience; and provides an overall evaluation.
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Introduction
Buybacks of fishing vessels, licences, access, use or
other rights, and gear, sometimes called decommis-
sioning schemes, address overcapacity, overexploi-
tation of fish stocks and distributional issues in
fisheries (Holland et al. 1999). Additional purposes
for buybacks are emerging as fisheries conservation
and management evolves, namely as conservation
of ecological–biodiversity public goods form an
increasingly important complement to the tradi-
tional concern with managing a common resource
and with the emergence of rights-based manage-
ment (Curtis and Squires 2007). (Public goods are
neither excludable as people cannot be excluded
from their use, nor depleted as one person’s use
diminishes another person’s enjoyment.) Buybacks
thus increasingly contribute to the sustainable use
of ecosystems, the services they provide and con-
tribute to the conservation of marine biodiversity,
all of which are public goods. These public goods
include marine reserves and fisheries managed to
comply with ecosystem objectives. Buybacks also
increasingly help provide a transition to a more
rationalized fishery based on strengthened property
and use rights and stronger private and public
fisheries governance.
Most buybacks focus on the vessel, gear and
licence, although some buybacks allow the pur-
chase of only gear, such as in the Italian clam
(Chamelea gallina, Veneridae) fishery buyback
(Spagnolo 2007). A limited number of buybacks
only focus on the licences of inactive permits,
such as in the New England groundfish fishery
(Thunberg et al. 2007).
This study reviews the global experience with
fisheries buybacks to develop guidelines and an
overall assessment for buyback programmes. The
study largely takes the practice of buybacks as a
given and as instruments of political economy, and
then asks under what conditions are they most
effective and how might they be best designed.
This study builds upon Campbell (1989), Campbell
and Lindner (1990), Nautilus Consultants (1997),
Woodrow (1998), Holland et al. (1999), Weninger
and McConnell (2000), Cunningham and Greboval
(2001), World Bank (2004), Clark et al. (2005,
2007), Squires et al. (2006) and Curtis and Squires
(2007), the latter of which contains three overview
chapters (Curtis and Squires 2007; Hannesson
2007a,b; Groves and Squires 2007) plus 13 case
studies (Cueff 2007; Fox et al. 2007; Grafton and
Nelson 2007; Guyader et al. 2007; Hannesson
2007a,b; Kirkley et al. 2007; Lindebo and Vesterg-
aard 2007; Riechers et al. 2007; Spagnolo 2007;
Spagnolo and Sabatella 2007a,b; Sun 2007; Thun-
berg et al. 2007) presented at the 2004 NOAA
Fisheries-University of California San Diego work-
shop, ‘InternationalWorkshop on Fishing Vessel and
License Buy-Back Programs’, plus Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
(2009), Martell et al. (2009) and Squires et al.
(2010). Many of the existing recent reviews and
analyses are unavailable to awider audience through
the peer-reviewed literature, and this study aims to
fill this gap. This study also adds additional discussion
on asymmetric information between the buyback
authority and asset owners and on the buyback
markets, especially auction markets, and the price
formation process. This review concentrates on key
lessons learned: conservation of ecological–biodiver-
sity public goods, asymmetric information issues of
moral hazard and adverse selection, design of the
buyback market and pricing, other critical design
issues, buybacks as strategy and a transitional policy
instrument, transnational fisheries, guidelines and
an overall assessment. Campbell (1989), Campbell
and Lindner (1990), Weninger and McConnell
(2000), Groves and Squires (2007), and Martell
et al. (2009) address economic welfare, and Wenin-
ger andMcConnell (2000) discuss investment issues,
both of which are not discussed in this study.
The study is organized as follows. First, we discuss
the reasons for buybacks discussed in the fisheries
literature. Second, we deal with the impacts of
buybacks. Third, we introduce the asymmetric
information problems that affect buybacks, notably
moral hazard, adverse selection, and inefficient
vessels known as ‘lemons’. Fourth, we discuss
buybacks as instruments for conservation of the
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public goods, the ecosystem and its services and
biodiversity. Fifth, we tackle design issues. Sixth we
discuss the setting of buyback prices and the design
of the buyback market. The next section considers
the financing options for buybacks. Then, we
highlight the importance of buybacks as a transition
policy rather than a policy in and of itself. The next
following section examines fundamental issues
arising for buybacks in transnational fisheries.
Finally we provide guidelines and Summary. An
Appendix discusses information asymmetry, includ-
ing principle–agent issues, moral hazard, adverse
selection and ‘lemons’.
What is the purpose of buybacks?
Fisheries buybacks address the overcapacity, overf-
ishing and conservation problems that plague many
fisheries. The reasons for these problems are open to
varying interpretations, which are beyond the scope
of this study. The specific fisheries buyback litera-
ture identifies at least eight principal and specific
reasons for buybacks, not necessarily mutually
exclusive. They are discussed by Campbell (1989),
Holland et al. (1999), Weninger and McConnell
(2000), World Bank (2004) and chapters in Curtis
and Squires (2007), and include: (i) directly
increasing economic efficiency; (ii) modernizing
fleets and adjusting their structure and composition;
(iii) facilitating the transition from fisheries with
overexploited stocks and overcapacity to private or
common rights-based conservation and manage-
ment; (iv) providing alternatives when rights-based
management is infeasible; (v) providing disaster or
crisis relief; (vi) addressing compensation and
distributional issues; (vii) conserving common
resources underlying a fishery; and (viii) conserving
biodiversity and ecological public goods.
What are the impacts of buybacks?
Buybacks generate changes in vessel-level behav-
iour, both intended and unintended. The changes
include: (i) short-run advantages that accrue to
vessels remaining in the fleet; (ii) remaining vessels
may increase investment or fish longer; (iii) exiting
vessels may be the least efficient or fish the least,
creating moral hazard and adverse selection issues;
and (iv) who gains and who loses, with crewmem-
bers gaining seldom or little.
Attitudes, incentives and cooperation can imp-
rove in a transition stage following a buyback. For
example, attitudes towards further changes in a
fishery improved when the Pacific coast groundfish-
ery was no longer in a crisis stage after buybacks.
In this fishery plagued by losses, fishers’ attitudes
bordered on desperation, incentives favouring
cooperation were hobbled and attitudes were non-
cooperative. Buybacks produced higher profits, or at
least more manageable losses, the exit of malcon-
tents and the fewer more committed players remain-
ing facilitated subsequent cooperation. Buybacks
restoring profitability gave breathing room to decide
further actions and enhance positive economic
behaviour, as fishers can behave very differently
when in a profitable fishery and with fewer fishers.
The fewer players began to coalesce and act like
de facto collective owners of the resource. The
intention of the Australian southeast trawl buyback
included the remedy of the acrimony over the initial
allocation and its associated uncertainty and litiga-
tion (Fox et al. 2007). The extent to which this
experience can be generalized to other fisheries is
unknown but important to corroborate.
Over the long-term, higher profits shared over
fewer fishery participants, even under a tight limited
entry programme, simply encourages additional
investment and the adoption of new technology,
both of which increase fishing capacity, plus
encourage additional fishing, meaning additional
utilization of fishing capacity and the capital stock.
As a result, profits erode and resource stocks may or
may not be reduced, depending on whether or not
there are Total Allowable Catches and the effective-
ness of compliance and enforcement. This was
precisely the case in Australia’s northern prawn
fishery based on the white banana (Fenneropenaeus
merguiensis, Penaeidae), the red-legged banana
(Fenneropenaeus indicus, Penaeidae), brown tiger
(Penaeus esculentus, Penaeidae), grooved tiger (Pena-
eus semisulcatus, Penaeidae), blue endeavour
(Metapenaeus endeavouri, Penaeidae) and the red
endeavour (Metapenaeus ensis, Penaeidae). In this
fishery, a series of industry-funded buybacks in
conjunction with government loans were required
to counter the growing fishing capacity and its
utilization (Newby et al. 2004, Fox et al. 2007).
Asymmetric information: moral hazard and
adverse selection
Asymmetric information between the buyback
authority (principal) and fishers (agents) in the
form of moral hazard and adverse selection can be
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serious issues with buyback programmes. (Moral
hazard is a special case of the problem of asymmet-
ric information, whereby the actions of one party to
a transaction are unobservable, so that one party in
a transaction has more information than another
(Mas-Colell et al. 1995). This is discussed further in
the Appendix, which also deals with asymmetric
information and adverse selection in greater detail.
See also Vestergaard (2010). Asymmetric informa-
tion can be especially important when the buyback
authority sets a fixed price rather than the vessel
owners through a reverse auction. Buyback markets
are prone to these problems, because owners of
vessels, permits or gear (agents) are more knowl-
edgeable about performance and characteristics of
their assets than is the buyback agency (principal).
During market transactions, the characteristics of
goods and services may not be fully observable to all
market participants and be asymmetrically held,
meaning that some participants hold information
that others do not. Thus, the principal and agent
may not have the same interests. Similarly during
regulation or fulfilment of a contract, an informa-
tion asymmetry exists between the regulator (prin-
cipal) who knows less than does the fisher (agent),
and this typically leads to economic inefficiency
when the fisher circumvents regulations or other-
wise does not fully comply with the regulation
(contract) (Vestergaard 2010). This inherent infor-
mation asymmetry and principal–agent problem is
the basis for monitoring and compliance. Asym-
metric information can give inefficient market
equilibriums, resulting in buyback programmes that
are not cost-effective.
Moral hazard – incentives to evade contract
requirements – can arise when the buyback author-
ity cannot fully observe the actions of vessel or
licence owners. Buybacks can rescue unprofitable
enterprises, which would otherwise be left to remain
or exit the fishery. If the fisher chooses to leave the
fishery, his vessel might be sold, perhaps for a
substantial loss. With a buyback scheme in place,
vessel owners would receive a higher price than
they would have expected, given that the buyback
scheme will have created an increase in demand
and will have raised the expected returns from
vessel ownership. Vessel buybacks can signal that
capital losses will always be limited, much more so
for publically funded buybacks. Reducing the over-
all risk in the industry encourages risk-averse
investors to invest more in fishing boats than they
otherwise would. Clark et al. (2005), through a
strict version of the rational expectations argument
with identical fishers and beliefs, suggest that
industry anticipation of publically funded buybacks,
especially repeated ones, can lead to vessel acqui-
sitions and greater overcapacity than would other-
wise occur. (Rational expectations assume that
people make choices based on rationality, available
information and past experiences. Forecasts are self-
fulfilling and policy does not influence people’s
decisions as it is rationally anticipated.)
Moral hazard may have been an issue in Norway
(Hannesson 2007a). Anecdotal evidence suggests
that ship owners, realizing potential gains from fleet
rationalization, quickly shelved a preliminary plan
for an industry-financed buyback when authorities
were prepared to use public money for this purpose.
In France, fishers have factored into asset values the
expectations of future government assistance for
leaving the industry (OECD 2009). Fishers have
learned to anticipate the buyouts and these expec-
tations have become capitalized in asset values,
forcing them up over time.
Adverse selection – targeting the ‘wrong’ vessels
– may arise when asymmetric information exists
between the buyback agency and vessel or permit
owners. Prior to market participation, owners
(agents) have more information about their vessel,
permit, intention to fish, and performance in the
fishery than does the buyback authority (principal).
The level of information differs among participants
in these potential market transactions, and costs of
acquiring information for the purchasing agency
may be high or even prohibitive. Owners know
whether vessels require repairs and maintenance,
have high operating costs and are less effective at
catching fish than other ostensibly comparable
vessels.
Adverse selection problems can arise when there
are ‘lemons’. These are vessels up for sale that are
often older, more in need of repair and less
productive at catching fish than many other vessels
in the fleet. Owners are often older and reaching the
end of their careers. Buybacks then simply acceler-
ate the exit of these vessels, which would have left
anyway in the near future. Buybacks then increase
the demand for vessels and firm up the market,
giving the sellers a higher price than they otherwise
would have received. In short, there is an incentive
for owners of ‘lemons’ to sell. Evidence suggests that
the French buybacks suffered from adverse selection
and sales of ‘lemons’ (Guyader et al. 2007; OECD
2009), as did the Italian Adriatic bottom trawl
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fishery (Spagnolo and Sabatella 2007b). The rate of
fishing capacity reduction brought about by the
buyback process is less than it would have other-
wise been for a given budget, and the resulting fleet
tends to be newer and more efficient than would
otherwise have occurred without the confounding
effect of adverse selection from otherwise exiting
‘lemons’.
Owners who are really keen to sell can give away
information about their unobservable knowledge
through observable actions. A market signal is an
action with economic consequences, and the buy-
back agency’s observation of the action may reveal
information that is otherwise hidden. For example, a
vessel seller could offer to employ a certified marine
surveyor to evaluate the prospective vessel and
classify the vessel’s status. Costless tests could
reliably reveal a minimum standard or create a
signal such that owners with a vessel of at least
acceptable quality will submit to the test, and
owners who choose not to submit to the evaluation
will be treated as being no better than the worst
type of vessel. Because sellers with good vessels are
more likely to be willing to take such actions, this
offer can serve as a signal of quality, which can lead
to a market equilibrium that distinguishes classes of
owners and ‘lemons’.
Alternative market responses to the problem of
unobservable vessel quality and productivity can
occur, in which the uninformed party, the buyback
authority (principal), take steps to distinguish or
screen the vessels on the other side of the market
(agents). Buyback authorities can develop mecha-
nisms to allow them to distinguish between vessels
or permits of differing fishing power, in other words
to identify ‘lemons’. Some buyback programmes,
notably the one in New England, USA, used a
screening approach based on a pricing metric using
estimated fishing capacity. Pricing on the basis of
physical capacity, such as per vessel, GRT or kW,
does not fully capture all of the information of a
vessel. Pricing on the basis of revenue, estimated
fishing capacity or catch can more closely capture
the information on actual and potential catch or
fishing capacity.
Adverse selection can be exacerbated when prices
offered by buyback authorities are lower than
otherwise warranted or expected in comparison
with existing second-hand market prices or an
expected equilibrium price in the buyback market.
Sellers of ‘lemons’ are far more likely to participate in
the market because the buyback price, which may be
set at some expected average, lies above what they
would otherwise receive on the open second-hand
market. Little trade may occur, and the buyback
market equilibrium is inefficient. Coordination fail-
ure can arise if the buyback authority expects the
productivity of vessels accepting a buyback offer to
be low and concurrently, the buyback offer price is
only accepted by owners of low-quality vessels
because the price offered is low. The agency can
improve the competitive equilibrium by increasing
the offer price. These problems suggest that multiple
rounds of pricing or allowing bids in a reverse
auction rather than setting fixed offer prices can help
set more efficient prices that lead to more cost-
effective buybacks, especially when the buyback
authority sets the fixed price rather than it being
established through a reverse auction.
Buybacks and conservation of ecological–
biodiversity public goods
Buybacks are being increasingly used to address the
protection and conservation of the public goods
created by ecosystems services and of biodiversity
(Curtis and Squires 2007). Examples include pro-
tecting coral reefs as was done by the buyback of
vessels fishing on Australia’s Great Barrier Reef, the
approach used by The Nature Conservation-Envi-
ronmental Defense Fund to promote sustainable
fishing and the social structure of the fleet along the
Central California coast (Groves and Squires 2007),
in which fishers can use the purchased licences
under specified conditions so that alternative
sources of income and sustainable harvesting
practices are both insured, and in the buyback
applied to the Australian northern prawn fishery to
reduce bycatch and protect sensitive sea grass beds
(World Bank 2004). Included in the current two-
round Australian buyback of statutory fishing rights
is the provision for a buyback of vessels and licences
from fishers who will be adversely affected by the
establishment of several large Marine Protected
Areas in the south-east marine region, thereby
providing compensation. Another example is the
permanent buyback of fishing permits, a temporary
leasing back of nets and compensation to fishers in
the northern Gulf of California who are willing to
switch to alternative fishing methods that exploit
new resources that maintain their income but do
not cause the endangered vaquitas (Phocoena sinus,
Phocoenidae) to be caught at the same time (Barlow
et al. 2010).
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Buybacks and replacement of vessels, rights or
gears with comparatively more harmful impacts on
the public goods of biodiversity and the ecosystem
may require additional and ongoing payments to
fishers if alternative livelihoods are unavailable or
offer lower net benefits (Niesten and Gjertsen 2009).
That is, a one-time payment may be insufficient. An
example is the replacement of J-hooks by circle
hooks in the longline fishery for Latin American
mahi-mahi or dolphin-fish (Coryphaena hippurus,
Coryphaenidae), which lowered the revenue from
the marketed catch even though the bycatch and
post-hooking mortality of sea turtles declined, espe-
cially of the Pacific leatherback (Dermochelys coria-
cea, Dermochelyidae). In essence, in this example,
the pay-offs to players in an infinitely repeating
conservation game, need to exceed direct conser-
vation costs such as new hooks, plus the opportunity
costs of conservation. (Opportunity costs are the
value of the next best alternative.) This must be true
for each time period through the buyback process if
incentives are to be restructured so as to favour
conservation in the long term.
Programme design issues
The buyback programme needs to be appropriately
designed. This section discusses the 10 most impor-
tant issues, each of which is stated first in italics.
First, the buyback programme should set clear goals
and objectives. There may be conflicting objectives,
such as removing fishing capacity and modernizing
the fishing fleet, financed by public subsidies. The
European Union Multi-Annual Guidance Programs,
for example, attempted to simultaneously satisfy the
multiple and conflicting objectives of reducing
fishing capacity and modernizing ageing fleets
(Cueff 2007; Guyader et al. 2007; Lindebo and
Vestergaard 2007). In the face of conflicting objec-
tives, narrowing the objectives down to those that
do not conflict and to the most important can be
expected to enhance programme success.
Second, the buyback programme requires a clearly
defined scope. Which gear types and fisheries, vessel-
size classes, geographic areas, full- or part-time
vessels often classed as being ‘latent’, commercial or
recreational, licences and/or vessels are all ques-
tions that arise and which also affect programme
size and budget. These strategic choices affect the
structure of the post-buyback fishery, cost-effective-
ness of the programme, type of incentives that are
generated and ultimate programme effectiveness.
Third, there are three critical preconditions that must
be fulfilled for an effective buyback programme. (i)
Proper registration of licences and vessels creates a
well-defined universe of eligible owners and provides
well-defined programme boundaries. (ii) Pro-
gramme organization and communication between
regulators and participants and among participants
facilitates success. (iii) Without in situ measures to
prevent new entry of catching power in place of that
removed, funds obtained by fishers from purchased
vessels or licences can be used to purchase an
upgraded or new vessel, to invest in existing vessels,
upgrade technology or can allow new participants
to enter. Public funding exacerbates this due to
additional, transferred funds. To the extent that
fishing asset owners anticipate publically funded
buybacks, owners may be motivated to acquire
additional assets, even if the prospects of realizing a
normal return on their investments is low (Clark
et al. 2005, 2007). Many buybacks are increasingly
financed by industry rather than by the public, so
that what Clark et al. (2005, 2007) call the
inconsistency problem is likely to be of minimal
importance in these instances. To address this in the
Italian Adriatic trawl buyback, the Italian govern-
ment introduced a moratorium on new licences and
a limit on construction of new vessels (Spagnolo and
Sabatella 2007b).
Fourth, the buyback programme must decide to
purchase the capital stock (vessel and/or gear) or the
licence, or both. Purchasing only the licence is
cheaper than purchasing the vessel and gear, which
in turn is generally cheaper than purchasing the
bundled vessel and licence. Licence prices may be
set at the market rate, although the expectation of
increased revenues after a capacity reduction may
cause licence prices to rise sharply, or at the value
required to encourage the chosen proportion of
fishermen to surrender their licences (Read and
Buck 1997).
Many vessels hold licences for multiple fisheries
and buybacks can create adverse spillover effects. If
the programme buys back only the licence, the
vessel remains free to fish elsewhere and in doing so
may easily shift its fishing capacity to another
fishery, whose utilization can even increase with the
increased available time. If the programme buys
back the vessel and gear but not the licence, the
licence, if transferable, can be used with another
vessel in the fishery. In this instance, pressures on
the fish stocks and economic rents may not be
abated, and may even increase if the licence is used
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with a vessel that is even more productive or utilized
longer than the vessel that was removed.
Purchasing only the licence frequently removes
vessels that are inactive or nearly so, but which
could potentially increase their fishing as the
profitability of the fishery improves. Inactive vessels
or those with low activity may have their primary
focus in other fisheries, and hold licences more as
options to fish, so that the licence price reflects
option value.
Licences can be attached and locked to vessels,
precluding the emergence of a separate market for
licences. The buyback makes no distinction between
the vessel and licence and the buyback price
includes the values of two assets. Fishing capacity
would not be allowed to shift to another fishery. If a
bought-out vessel also held licences for other
fisheries and these licences were also attached to
the vessel, then the buyback price could include the
licence values from the other fisheries and reflect the
expected profitability from those fisheries.
Multiple licences for the same fishery may be held
with the vessel – or ‘stacked’. When licences are
attenuated by limits to capacity, stacking then
allows a larger vessel or catch. The buyback price
can be expected to increase with stacking.
Fifth, the buyback programme can be voluntary or
mandatory. Most buybacks are voluntary. One of the
few mandatory buybacks programmes was the
Northern Australian prawn fishery (Holland et al.
1999). The Japanese longline fishery buyback
allowed mandatory participation should there be
insufficient voluntary participation (Kuronuma
1997). The buyback programme of high seas
longliners in Chinese Taipei was also mandatory
(Sun 2007; OECD 2009). In these instances, the
thorny issue of determining who must sell has to be
addressed. The Italian clam fishery buyback was
voluntary, but the programme nonetheless required
a minimum number of vessels in each area.
Sixth, the buyback programme should limit reuse of
the purchased vessel, gear or licence, with scrapping of
the vessel and/or gear or permanent retirement of the
licence the best practice, in order to prevent increases in
fishing capacity in the fishery of concern or spillovers to
other fisheries. Vessels not scrapped can be used in
another fishery, therefore transferring the common
fish stock and public good externalities to another
fishery. Even if a vessel is not transferred, buyout
funds might be used to purchase vessels in other
fisheries. Some buybacks allow construction of new
vessels if the previous vessel is scrapped. The Italian
government introduced a moratorium on new
licences and limited construction of new vessels in
the Adriatic groundfish fishery (Spagnolo and Sab-
atella 2007b). Some buybacks restrict the use of the
vessel or licence in that country, but allow sale
abroad as was done in Norway (Hannesson 2007a).
This just exports the problem to another country
and fishery. The Italian driftnet buyback allowed
vessels to convert to another activity or gear. This
reconversion into the use of passive gears produced
an increase in fishing effort in close proximity to the
shore. This area was already exploited by a consid-
erable number of vessels belonging to small-scale
fisheries (Spagnolo and Sabatella 2007a). In some
cases, vessels might be sold to help finance the
buyback as happened in the British Columbia
salmon troll buyback (Grafton and Nelson 2007),
but this can spillover to other fisheries. A pro-
gramme that does not require scrapping may have
an impact on the price of the vessel to be bought
out, and second-hand vessel prices may fall, which
becomes a pecuniary externality. (Pecuniary exter-
nalities redistribute income through changes in
relative prices.)
Seventh, strong conditions should be placed on
reinvestment of buyback funds in the buyback fishery
to limit reinvestment or new investment. In the
Australian South East trawl fishery, the purchase
of latent licences, although partially limiting future
increases in fishing effort appears to have facilitated
additional investment in the same fishery as public
funds obtained from the sale of inactive licences
were evidently invested by operators in the capacity
of active vessels. Ideas must be given to use these
funds in spillover fisheries.
Eighth, most buyback programmes entail one-time
payments, but some programmes may need recurring
payments to cover ongoing opportunity costs and
alternative sources of income and livelihood for sellers
who are not entirely exiting fisheries altogether, espe-
cially when the buyback is oriented to the public goods of
conservation and ecosystem services and to developing
countries (World Bank 2004, Niesten and Gjertsen
2009). Many buyback programmes in higher
income countries effectively accelerate the exit of
fishers ready to leave in the near future, either to
retire or shift sectors or fisheries, so that one-shot
payments suffice with adverse selection. Especially
in developing countries or in isolated and marginal
areas elsewhere, fishing communities may have
limited alternative sources of livelihood and require
ongoing buyback payments to create incentives for
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selling and compliance. In effect, the alternative
livelihoods along with the buyback payment covers
opportunity costs so that no party loses and
restructured incentives provide a continuing incen-
tive rather than a one-shot buyback payment with
its one-shot incentive. The main problem is that this
differs little from an international environmental
agreement where all parties must gain (Barrett
2003). Fishers who have been bought out and who
have no alternative source of income will stay busy
at something. Buybacks of harmful gear and its
replacement by more beneficial gear as in the
buybacks and replacement of J-hooks by circle-
hooks in the coastal Latin American swordfish
(Xiphias gladius, Xiphiidae) fisheries in the Eastern
Pacific Ocean are an example of a one-shot
approach. This process also forms a desirable and
beneficial Pigovian subsidy and lump-sum transfer
for reducing the public bad of a bycatch of sea
turtles, so maintaining or even increasing non-
market economic values. A Pigovian subsidy covers
costs external to firms or consumers and helps to
provide a socially optimal amount of a public good
that is otherwise under-supplied and subject to free
riding behaviour. Lump-sum transfers can help
insure that an economically efficient Pareto rather
than Nash-Cournot optimum (that is economically
inefficient and occurs without collective action) is
reached.
Ninth, buyback programmes need to consider condi-
tions on fishing time. This is an issue of trade-offs
between capital and its utilization and, even more
broadly, fishing capacity and its utilization. Buy-
backs may not only limit allowed fishing time to
reduce utilization of all stock inputs, notably the
stocks of labour and capital, but also limit the use of
variable inputs (for example, fuel) that are closely
tied to time. Limits on fishing time attempt to
manage the flow of capital services and hence
utilization of the capital stock, and fishing capacity
in general. When buybacks are a precursor to
rights-based management, especially through indi-
vidual transferable quotas or sector allocations
(group quotas) of harvests or fishing effort, then
decentralized markets in the former and groups of
fishers in the latter address the issue of fishing time;
otherwise, the buyback authority should tackle this
issue.
Tenth, some buyback programmes set other condi-
tions on vessels and licences that are purchased.
Buybacks do not address the underlying property
rights issue so that incentives to expand production
remain and can even increase if the fishery recovers.
In this case, the buybacks can be coupled with other
measures to more closely align private incentives
with socially desired goals. Buybacks can be tied to
quotas as in Norway or to an alternative livelihoods
support mechanism (World Bank 2004). Buybacks
were tied to the pre-existing ITQ programme in the
Australian South East multispecies groundfish trawl
fishery (Fox et al. 2007). Buybacks can be tied to
gear restrictions, limited access, prohibitions on
resale or reuse of vessels, licences, and gear, and
cooperative agreements and self-management.
Buyback prices and markets
Buybacks occur through formal or informal markets
during which buyback prices for the purchased
assets are set. Four basic systems have been used:
one-on-one negotiations, independent valuations,
fixed prices and auctions (Holland et al. 1999).
Fixed prices and auctions are the two most widely
used methods and are less susceptible to collusion
and strategic behaviour. Auction design can address
adverse selection problems. Competitive bidding can
reduce information rents and increase cost-effec-
tiveness but increases transactions costs. Ideally, the
auction bid reveals the bidder’s true opportunity
cost of the vessel, licence or gear, thereby rectifying
the information asymmetry. Both fixed price and
auction market approaches are examined next.
Fixed buyback prices
The buyback authority offers a fixed price for the
vessel, licence, gear or right, established on the basis
of some criteria established by the authority, and
the seller of the asset accepts or rejects the price. The
fixed price is set on the basis of some metric such as
the entire vessel per unit of well capacity, per metre
of vessel length or per licence for some vessel-size
class. Fixed prices might also be weighted by some
criteria, such as in France where the fixed price is
weighted according to the fish species targeted by
the vessels (Guyader et al. 2007). Martell et al.
(2009) discuss several additional approaches. In
Denmark, applications for buyback were weighted
according to pre-defined categories including age of
the vessel, species composition in the catch, the
owner’s age and days fishing days (Nautilus Con-
sultants 1997). In the Italian clam fishery, buyback
the fixed price was calculated on the basis of the
market value of the licence (Spagnolo 2007).
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There are advantages and disadvantages to the
fixed price approach compared with auctions. Fixed
prices provide less information than auctions, as
sellers, who are better informed than the buyback
authority, do no provide their own offer price and
there is less competition and information revealed in
setting the price. Fixed prices increase the scope for
opportunistic behaviour resulting from informa-
tional asymmetries. This approach is administra-
tively easier to establish and less costly to administer
than auctions (i.e. lower transactions costs) but is
generally less cost-effective at removing capacity
than are auctions, because a higher price is paid to
owners of ‘lemons’ and heterogeneous assets than
they would receive by an auction in which greater
private information is revealed. Thus, the fixed price
may bear little relationship to the actual willingness
of asset owners to receive compensation for exiting
the fishery. When prices are set too low, then some
good fishers but predominately owners of ‘lemons’
leave. Alternatively, when prices are set too high,
the programme may cost more to reach its targets
than is necessary. It requires the authority to set the
price beforehand rather than asset owners setting
the price through a decentralized process of com-
petitive bidding or auction that takes into account
the private information of bidders. Only when the
information asymmetry is not too great and vessels
or other assets of concern are relatively homoge-
neous in value will the adverse selection and
‘lemons’ problem be limited in scope. When adverse
selection is limited and the fixed price comes close to
an efficient price, only then will the buyback be
comparatively cost-effective in its goal of reducing
capacity. A one-shot uniform-price auction and use
of the information gained in the bidding process
can be used to devise and calibrate an appropriate
fixed-price scheme (Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi
2005).
The buyback price offered by a particular
programme may not equilibrate supply and de-
mand, and the quantity of assets supplied or
demanded can exceed or fall short of the funds
available. When there is excess quantity demanded
or supplied corresponding to the fixed offer price,
rationing criteria are required. For example, the
Italian Adriatic buyback faced excess supply of
licences and prioritized vessels belonging to fleet
segments that had still not attained the buyback
objective (Spagnolo and Sabatella 2007b). Other
possible criteria include primary port or fishing area,
vessel-size classes, vessel age, gear type and species
fished. The Italian clam buyback, which used a fixed
price approach purchased vessels across a range of
fishing areas and were chosen by granting priority
to those areas where pressure on the resource was
highest (Spagnolo 2007). When there is excess
demand and not enough vessels or rights to satisfy
it, the buyback is no longer voluntary but is
mandatory. When there are multiple rounds of
buybacks, fewer and fewer fishers may be interested
in selling vessels or rights and some form of
compulsory criteria are required such as in the
Australian northern prawn fishery.
Auctions to establish buyback price
Auctions are generally more cost-effective than are
fixed price buybacks, largely because: (i) more
privately held information is established and
revealed, where the better-informed asset owners
set the buyback price through competition rather
than it being set by the less well-informed authority,
thereby reducing uncertainty; (ii) there is more
competition; and (iii) there is less information
asymmetry between the asset owners and the
buyback authority. [See Klemperer (2004), Milgrom
(2004), Athey et al. (2004), Latacz-Lohmann and
Schilizzi (2005) and Whitford (2007), for the theory
behind this section.] Auctions help achieve (alloca-
tive) efficiency with minimal information required
from the agency as the better-informed bidders
reveal their privately held information, but trans-
actions costs can be higher. Auction prices are more
likely to reflect the fishers’ true opportunity costs,
reduce price uncertainty, create more competition
and reduce information asymmetry compared with
a centrally decided fixed price.
All auction formats select the bidders with the
highest valuation, so that all auction formats
are economically efficient (Latacz-Lohmann and
Schilizzi 2005). Thus there is no incentive after
the auction to reallocate the traded asset among
bidders. None of the losing bidders would be willing
to offer a price that would top the winner’s
valuation.
The buyback authority often compares the auc-
tion price to some reference or reservation price to
determine whether or not to accept the auction
price. Collusion and entry are considerations, and
keeping bidding costs low encourages entry and
competitiveness of the buyback market. Collusion
may be present in buybacks but is seldom discussed
or noted.
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There are many different types of auctions.
Klemperer (2004) distinguishes ascending-bids,
descending-bids and first-price sealed bids where
each bidder independently submits a single bid
without seeing others’ bids, with the sale going to
the bidder with the highest bid and the winner pays
the highest or first-price. English auctions are
ascending bids with open information and Dutch
auctions are descending bids with open information.
A Vickrey auction or second-price sealed bid occurs
when each bidder independently submits a single
bid, without seeing the bids of others with the object
sold to the bidder with the highest bid. The price
paid is the second-highest bidder’s bid or second-
price, an incentive-compatible revelation procedure.
First-price sealed bid auctions are most common
with buybacks. Most auctions in theory provide the
same revenue to the bid-taker, known as the
Revenue Equivalence Theorem, but are not equiv-
alent in practice (Whitford 2007).
Auctions are usually discriminatory, in which the
authority pays each bidder his/her actual winning
bid. In a uniform-price auction, all units earn the
cut-off price, which is either the highest accepted or
lowest rejected bid, and all winners except the one at
the cut-off price receives payments higher than the
opportunity costs implied in their bids. A bidder’s
(unique) bid only determines the chance of winning
but not the payment received. A bidder’s dominant
strategy is to bid his/her true opportunity costs. The
potential for adverse selection is higher. Buyback
auctions have all been discriminatory.
Buybacks invariably employ reverse (supply)
auctions that drive prices downward rather than
forward (demand) auctions that drive prices up-
ward. Key features include: single or multiple
rounds of bidding (single or sequential auctions),
open or closed (sealed) bids, rules for determining
the winning bidders, potential for collusion, time
requirements for preparing and conducting the
auction, reserve prices, private value in which each
bidder knows his/her value of the object for sale but
this is kept as private information, or common value
where the actual value is the same for everyone but
bidders have different private information about the
actual value. There are also revocable or irrevocable
bids, penalties for bid defaults, bids responsive or
non-responsive to criteria and conditions estab-
lished, and choice of price metric or weights on bids
to achieve different policy objectives. Double auc-
tions, in which the authority (buyer) submits a
desired price and sellers submit bids, have not been
used. Externalities between bidders are possible if
they care about which competitors submit bids.
Prohibitive transactions costs can preclude sequen-
tial auctions as used for offshore oil leases in the
USA.
Kitts et al. (2001) and Bustic and Bromley (2006)
econometrically analyse bids in the New England
and Pacific coast groundfish buybacks, discuss the
bidding process in considerable detail and discuss
the econometric issues involved.
Reverse auctions
Single (simultaneous) sealed bid, reverse discrimi-
natory auctions are the most common form of
buyback auction. In a typical programme, the owner
of the asset, which can be the vessel, gear or licence,
submits a sale offer (bid), which the buyback
authority ranks or orders on the basis of some
metric such as the highest to the lowest offer price
per unit of length, and purchases the lowest, next
lowest, bid and so on until the budget is exhausted.
The US Bering Sea/Aleutian Island (BSAI) King (red
king crab Paralithodes camtschaticus, blue king crab
Paralithodes platypus and golden king crab Lithodes
aequispinus, Lithodidae) and Tanner crab (Chionoece-
tes bairdi, and Chionoecetes opilio, Oregoniidae) fish-
ery all employed a first-price sealed bid
discriminatory reverse auction. The weighting cri-
teria, such as by catch or revenue history, allows
discrimination among different fleet segments (bid-
ding pools) or fishery management objectives.
Bids can be optionally compared with the reserve
price established by the authority, purchasing those
falling below to insure winning bids satisfy pre-
established objectives and reducing incentives for
collusion. Multiple round (sequential) reverse auc-
tions can first conduct a single bid reverse auction,
but then publicly reveal information from the
previous round, and seek revised bids. This
approach provides the most information, but entails
higher transactions costs and can lead to strategic
behaviour by asset owners. Reverse auction winners
may be subject to the winner’s curse, in which the
winner receives less than the losers after underes-
timating the value of a sold comparable asset, and
this may cause everyone to bid cautiously.
Reservation prices
Reserve prices in a reverse auction are the maxi-
mum amount the authority will pay, which can be
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pre-announced or not. The reserve price can be
fixed or discretionary (decision to accept is discre-
tionary to the authority). Reserve prices insure
against over-payment and, in second-price auctions,
they insure that the winner’s actual payment is not
‘too far’ below the runner-up bid, which grows with
importance with thin markets (few participants).
Reserve prices represent the demand side of the
market and the buyback authority’s marginal
willingness to pay. They are particularly useful if
competition is expected to be weak or if collusion
and learning is a serious possibility, especially in
auctions of multiple rounds, or keeping the author-
ity to a budget, or if bid-rigging is a serious
possibility, but they can also limit bidders’ partici-
pation and reduce bidders’ competition. Optimal
auction design states that bid-takers should always
set reserve prices, set them sufficiently high or low,
and never purchase the asset if it fails to make the
reserve price. In short, reserve prices are recom-
mended best practice.
The authority’s reserve price may be the current
or previous years’ market prices for second-hand
assets obtained from brokers or trade magazines
constructed following a formula, or obtained from
appraisers. The 1972 British Columbia salmon
buyback purchased vessels after valuation by an
independent appraiser (Grafton and Nelson 2007).
Vessels in the Washington salmon vessel buyback
were purchased at an agreed price based on two
appraisals by independent appraisers. Licence prices
were fixed, and gear was valued at a fixed rate of
depreciation from the original cost. One model used
was the present value of expected future net
earnings plus the difference between the cost of
scrapping the vessel and its salvage value (Kitts
et al. 2001). Kirkley and Squires (1988) used
hedonic regression to obtain expected vessel prices.
Available information
Fishers formulate bids or accept offers based on their
private information and their assessment of the
expected or existing bids and valuations of other
fishers. Information acquisition affects both the
efficiency of the allocation implemented in the auc-
tion and the amount of capacity removed by the
buyback. Owners hold some private information
about the value of their assets, while all potential
participants hold some information in common.
Information acquisition can be either open or closed;
bidders may or may not observe information
acquisition by others. Information is a strategic
variable when information acquisition is closed. The
identity of bidders can affect outcomes, meaning that
different information is offered depending onwhether
the identity of bidders is revealed and who is actually
bidding. Buyback authorities also hold information,
such as reserve prices, bid discrimination mecha-
nisms, and other factors it values in the auction, and
must decide howmuch to reveal to potential bidders.
Increasing the common information available to
owners about what are reasonable expectations if
they submit a bid should increase the efficiency of
the price discovery process and reduce strategic
behaviour and transactions costs, especially in
sealed bid auctions. The public authority does not
necessarily have to release all available information,
but can disclose an average bid price and perhaps
available budget, bid discrimination criteria such as
price metrics, targeted sectors or capacity target.
The less bidders are able to assess the quality of their
bids, the more their bidding strategies will be driven
by strategic motives and randomness, and the less
they will be driven by quality–cost considerations,
leading to greater efficiency distortions (Latacz-
Lohmann and Schilizzi 2005). The British Columbia
experience indicates that release of public informa-
tion has advantages (Grafton and Nelson 2007).
The experimental economics literature shows that
releasing individual bits of information does not
harm the price formation process. Releasing infor-
mation may help the process converge to equilib-
rium, as long as there are enough bidders to
preclude collusion. Fishers can practice with com-
puter program of simulated auctions and markets to
fully learn the price-formation process.
Irrevocable bids and penalties
Bids can be specified as irrevocable or retractable
where there is an opportunity to reconsider partic-
ipation as in New England (Kitts et al. 2001).
Irrevocable bids militate against speculation, which
absorbs considerable sums of money with minimal
capacity reduction. Penalties can be imposed on
defaulted bids to preclude bidding for options on
prizes rather than prizes themselves.
Eligibility requirements and scoring or ranking of
bids and metrics
Price and distribution can be affected by eligibility
requirements, bid ranking systems, bid weighting
A review of fisheries buybacks D Squires
376  2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd, F I SH and F I SHERIES , 11, 366–387
criteria and direct allocation of funds among groups
(bidding pools). Eligibility requirements are ex ante
instruments and bid scoring is an ex post instrument
for determining participation. Eligibility require-
ments can limit the number of participants, opening
the way for collusion and strategic behaviour. The
scoring or ranking of bids affects who stays and who
exits, thereby determining the composition of the
remaining fleet, the amount of capacity that is
removed or fishery management objectives.
A problem with bid systems involving the sale of
a vessel is that everyone offers a different product –
there is no homogeneous metric and the possession
of information is asymmetric (leading to adverse
selection and ‘lemons’). Use of units of size, revenue
or capacity militates against this problem. Licences
for a given category of fishing boat or fishery are
closer in equivalence than are the vessels them-
selves and hence easier to judge and require less
information.
In ranking bids, consideration can be given to
bid discrimination mechanisms, including permit or
vessel category, home port, area fished, primary
gear, size, length of time in the fishery or any other
criterion to target buybacks. Bids with multiple
dimensions require weighting. Eligibility conditions
and grant size in the Danish buyback depend on
vessel tonnage and age (Lindebo and Vestergaard
2007). The Italian clam fishery vessel buyback
required a minimum number of vessels to be
withdrawn in each fishing area, reflecting the
spatial distribution of sessile clams (Spagnolo 2007).
Sealed vs. open bid auctions with heterogeneous
bidders
Sealed bid auctions are less certain to bidders as
rival bids are unknown, and tacit collusion is
harder as bidding is not used as a signal. Evidence
from other industries comparing the effects of
sealed and open bid auctions shows that sealed bid
auctions attract more entrants, especially small
bidders that shift the allocation towards weaker
bidders. Revenue is frequently higher with sealed
bidding. Calling-out auctions, in which an auc-
tioneer successfully calls increasing bids, are never
used apparently with buybacks. These approximate
the results of a Vickrey auction (discussed below),
as the second highest bidder should stop at his/her
willingness to pay. The highest bidder then gets
the goods at a cost somewhat higher than this
final call. Bidder competitiveness may be an
important issue in the choice of format for an
auction.
First- or second-price sealed bid auctions
First- or second-price sealed bid auctions are
demand revealing and are mostly used when a
unique and homogeneous item is sold, often
sequentially if there are multiple units or items.
This differs from a simultaneous sale of a group of
heterogeneous items such as vessels. In a second-
price reverse auction, which is a form of Vickrey
auction, the bidder offering the highest bid wins but
only pays the price of the second-highest bidder.
Bidders bid their own valuations. Bidding below
valuation reduces the chance of winning the
auction, as this entails the risk of another partici-
pant topping the bidder’s bid, and bidding above
one’s own valuation may increase the chance of
winning the auction but in the end paying more
than the bidder’s own valuation. Bids in the Vickrey
auction thus reveal bidders’ valuations. Reservation
prices that must be paid at a minimum help insure
against gross discrepancies in lowest and runner-up
bids. In first-price (best and final) auctions, all
bidders submit bids, bidders submitting the highest
bid win and bidders tend to bid below their true
valuation but pay the highest bid. Second-price
auctions can be susceptible to collusion. Second-
price sealed bid reverse discriminatory auctions
have promise but have not yet been used in
buybacks.
Uniform price sealed bid reverse auctions
In uniform price sealed bid reverse auctions, the
winning bids are paid the lowest or second-lowest
price actually bid, even if some bids were higher.
This type of auction appears to be fair but is
vulnerable to collusion and can deter entry into an
auction. In a variant, bidders can submit willing-
ness to pay for different quantities sold of a
homogenous asset creating a demand function.
Uniform price auctions can create windfall rents
and are more expensive than other types of auction.
Strike price auctions
In a strike price auction, fishers submit sealed bids,
which the buyback authority weights according to a
set of criteria and are accepted until some specified
limit of fishing capacity is purchased (OECD 2009).
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This approach contrasts with accepting bids until a
budget constraint rather than a fishing capacity
constraint is met. All accepted applications are paid
the same price as the final accepted (strike) bid. This
approach, which provides an incentive to offer a low
price in order to be one of the accepted bids, was
used in the Northern Ireland buyback programme.
Single vs. multiple rounds of buybacks
Buybacks can occur in single or multiple rounds but
usually in multiple rounds due to budget reasons,
including the Taiwan offshore fishery and in
Norway (Hannesson 2007a; Sun 2007). Buybacks
in stages, which are essentially sequential auctions,
have a number of advantages, which are that the
revealed common information allows gauging of the
bid market and beneficial learning, adjusted pay-
ments target particular groups of fishers or desired
vessel numbers or capacity level, and the criteria for
accepting bids can be adjusted and fishers have the
chance to reformulate their bids as they better
understand the buyback market and buyback
programme. Multiple rounds of bidding also help
dampen the frequency of speculative bids.
Buybacks in stages have disadvantages. Prices
may increase as multiple rounds progress. With the
removal of an asset, supply falls and remaining
assets increase in value, partly because fewer assets
remain and partly due to gains in rents capitalized
into asset prices. There can be strategic behaviour in
which the sellers know that they can submit bids in
later rounds and may try to increase their bids by
delaying. This creates an option, which can be
factored into the price. Moreover, repeated buyback
programmes can reduce investment risk and there-
by encourage excessive capacity. If reservation
prices remain fixed, bidders learn more about this
price and can insure against bid prices much below
the reservation price. Similarly, due to bidders’
learning, the average bid in later rounds can closely
match the maximum acceptable payment level from
preceding rounds, in which case information about
the average or the maximum accepted bids or the
distribution of bids received in preceding rounds
should not be revealed by the authority or auction
rules can be varied by round or different groups
targeted by round.
Vessel and licence buyback prices may establish a
price floor in the second-hand market. Buybacks
could announce that the longer the delay the lower
the payment in order to reduce the strategic
behaviour of vessel or licence owners who delay
participation. Multiple rounds can also raise admin-
istrative costs.
Availability of funding often determines whether
to implement the buyback in one or multiple
rounds. Funding may only be available to allow
multiple stages. If the buyback is industry funded,
do single or multiple rounds better allow the
remaining vessels to have the funds necessary to
finance a buyback? A single round allows faster
recovery of profits and hence the ability to finance.
No single approach is necessarily best, but depends
on which approach works best in the situation of
concern.
Financing buybacks
Governments have largely funded buybacks but
more recently complete or partial private financing
has increasingly been used. Public funding may be
appropriate initially to correct past policy errors but
are effectively government subsidies for improved
fisheries performance (World Bank 2004). Mixtures
of funding have also been used, combining com-
mercial and recreational fishing interests with
public funds as in Texas (Riechers et al. 2007).
The US Nature Conservancy (TNC) and Environ-
mental Defense have together funded a buyback of
bottom trawlers and permits on California’s central
coast to protect the ecosystem and its services. NGO
or publically funded buybacks to conserve ecosys-
tem and biodiversity public goods can represent
desirable and beneficial Pigovian subsidies. (Pigo-
vian subsidies help provide the optimum level of a
public good that is otherwise undersupplied due to
benefits external to the private provider and free
riding. Such Pigovian subsidies are economically
desirable, i.e. they are not ‘bad’.)
Buybacks funded by industry use income that is
expected to rise as the fishery recovers and a public
loan can fund the early period of the programme.
One option is a ‘pay-as-you-go’ or incremental
approach that purchases assets on an annual basis
with funds that are raised each year through an
industry levy (Martell et al. 2009). A second, ‘big
bang’ option purchases most or all of the licences
immediately using borrowed funds, usually from the
public sector. This second approach is the one most
widely adopted. A combination of the two is also
possible with a single-sizeable buyback in the
beginning funded by a public loan and then an
ongoing, incremental buyback. Martell et al. (2009)
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observe that the ‘big bang’ approach is more
desirable from a stock-rebuilding and long-term
economic perspective compared with the incremen-
tal approach.
The buybacks in the US Pacific coast groundfish
trawl fishery, the BSAI crab fisheries off Alaska, the
Australian northern prawn fishery and buybacks in
Iceland under the management programme of
individual transferable quotas provide examples in
which a landings tax, licence fee or charges on asset
values finance the public loan repayment. The
public bears a substantial portion of the risk
generated by the loan. The debt obligation of a
commercial or recreational fisher-financed buyback
becomes collective rather than individual and
spreads the risk among those remaining. Payment
can be apportioned as the relative share of total
economic value: commercial interests pay according
to their share of economic rent; recreational anglers
fund the share of indirect use values; the public and
NGOs fund the share corresponding to existence and
indirect use values of environmental public goods.
Partial or full commercial and recreational fisher
financing of buybacks can be justified to the extent
that benefits are realized in markets or pertain to
direct and indirect use values with the ultimate
burden shared between industry and consumers
according to the relative elasticities of supply and
demand.
Private financing also helps to counter any moral
hazard issues that arise when the public sector
effectively provides a publically funded insurance
scheme to protect against worsening conditions in
an industry. This moral hazard is aggravated when
the industry anticipates public funding (assuming
rational expectations), especially with multiple
rounds of buybacks (Clark et al.2005, 2007). Private
financing may be initiated by public loans, especially
in initially depressed fisheries. Public and NGO
financing of buybacks is economically justified to
the extent that benefits are non-market and pertain
to public goods such as benefits to the ecosystem or
biodiversity, or benefits satisfy social and political
objectives, which are often distributional.
Public-financed buybacks where the money is
raised by a tax levied elsewhere in the economy can
also generate a dead weight loss in consumer and
producer surplus or net national benefits. A pri-
vately funded buyback financed by a tax levied on
landings or a lump sum provides the additional
benefit of a Pigovian tax because it compels fishing
firms to confront or internalize at least some of the
external cost that arises through the resource stock
externality. (A Pigovian tax is a tax on costs
external to the firm or vessel with a goal to
internalize these external costs on consumers and
producers. A lump-sum tax does not change
behaviour at the margin.) This lastly establishes
incentives that favour sustainable harvests of the
resource stock. Such a Pigovian tax does not
generate a deadweight loss compared with a typi-
cally sales or income tax, which lowers social
welfare, and instead raises social welfare by reduc-
ing and internalizing external costs.
Buybacks as a transition to a rationalized
fishery
The real importance of buybacks occurs when they
create a transition to a rationalized fishery based on
strong and enforced individual or group rights on
catch, bycatch and, to a lesser degree, on one ormore
of the components of fishing effort, the inputs, and
enhanced private and public governance. Buybacks
especially as an instrument of political economy
create a window of opportunity to transform behav-
iour by making cooperation among fishers a domi-
nant strategy and to align more closely private
incentives with social goals and objectives. Buybacks
are thus a strategic choice that restructures incen-
tives. Buybacks can also address the problem aggra-
vated by creation of marine reserves that simply
move displaced vessels onto other fishing grounds,
thereby aggravating what is typically a pre-existing
problem of overfishing and overcapacity.
When fisheries are mired in debt and without
profits cooperation is difficult to achieve among
players. This non-cooperative behaviour is brought
about by individual exceptionally high discount
rates, especially under regulated open access, where
vessel owners scramble to cover vessel mortgages,
keep crews employed and together and cover
operating costs. Restored profitability creates incen-
tives for cooperation. Compensation to potential
losers or immalleable capital with low opportunity
costs (capital with limited alternatives) remove
potential blockers of rationalization.
Removing redundant capital with few alterna-
tives for its redeployment accompanied by low
opportunity costs leads to the faster removal of
excess capacity (Newby et al. 2004). With fewer
players remaining there is the potential for cooper-
ation to increase and so ease the establishment of
rights-based management. Those fishers remaining
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are those most committed to the fishery further
strengthening incentives for cooperation. Australia,
New Zealand, the BSAI crab fisheries off Alaska, and
the USA Pacific Coast groundfishery all employed
this strategy before instituting individual transfer-
able quotas. The Italian clam buyback was a
precursor to a self-managed allocation of vessels
within the sector, which is a form of group use
rights.
Buybacks in transnational fisheries
Buybacks in transnational fisheries have been used
in the Italian swordfish fishery (Spagnolo and
Sabatella 2007a) by members of the Organization
for Responsible Tuna Fishing (OPRT) for longline
tuna vessels, and the Government of Chinese Taipei
for its high seas longline fleet (Sun 2007). Although
buybacks are often instituted to address the resource
stock externality arising from incomplete property
rights and sometimes public good externalities,
transnational buybacks must also address the trans-
national externality in which multilateral coopera-
tion is required. [A transnational externality arises
with shared or transboundary resources in which
the outcome that any one country can realize
depends not only on its own actions, but also on
what others do (Barrett 2003).] Thus, unilateral
buybacks face a free-rider problem in which states
that do not fund and participate in a buyback
scheme enjoy any resulting benefits without bearing
any of the costs; the Italian swordfish fishery faced
this issue (Spagnolo and Sabatella 2007a). To
varying degrees, all of the transnational buybacks
mentioned above ran into this problem. In a broad
sense, a transnational buyback needs to be self-
enforcing. That is, there is no third party to enforce
the buyback agreement. The buyback ultimately
rests upon the voluntary agreement to participate by
nations, such as the members of a Regional Fisheries
Management Organization, members of the OPRT,
or signatories to other treaties and agreements.
Limited entry is especially important with trans-
national fisheries. Without an end to free access,
buyback gains can easily be eroded but limited entry
in these fisheries is difficult to achieve (Hallman
et al. 2010).
Compliance in a transnational buyback can be
more complex than in a domestic buyback due to
national sovereignty and the ease of entry into most
transnational fisheries. Enforcement provisions for
a buyback require special consideration. One possi-
bility is a requirement that each of the parties
adopt domestic legislation supporting the buyback.
Domestic legislation is easy to observe but of course
enforcement can be another issue altogether. Trade
and port measures may be required for enforcement.
Buybacks may be critical to the implementation
of rights-based management in transnational fish-
eries. An especially problematic hurdle to limited
entry in transnational fisheries is the initial alloca-
tion. In order to achieve limited entry with multiple
states, which is a form of multilateral cooperation,
especially when there are developing country
coastal states and distant water fishing nations, an
‘over-allocation’ of harvest or effort rights may be
necessary so that all parties ostensibly gain (This is
actually a side payment from reduced future
benefits.). An example is the capacity programme
of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission,
which limited the total well capacity of tuna purse
seiners and allocated shares among countries. Some
developing country coastal states may receive an
allocation, even though they currently do not have
a fishing fleet, effectively receiving an option.
Buybacks can then be used to reduce the overca-
pacity. Financing can be through a tax on landings
of developing and developed vessels alike.
Guidelines
This review of buybacks offers specific guidelines
based on best practices from around the globe and
from information in the literature.
1. Preventing overcapacity, overfishing and eco-
system and biodiversity degradation before the
event is far easier and cheaper than reducing
once the fishery has become well established.
2. Buyback design is a strategic choice affecting
incentives and potentially plays a strategic role
in a transition to a more rationalized fishery
based on rights-based management and
strengthened governance. Rights can be indi-
vidual or group and on catches or on fishing
effort. Buybacks potentially restructure incen-
tives and relations among participants through
improving the economic conditions during a
window of opportunity following a buyback.
Buybacks potentially restructure fisher strate-
gies and behaviour encouraging a shift to
cooperation and hasten restructuring and
rights-based management. As buybacks do not
change the underlying property rights, long-run
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incentives remain to over-invest in an open or
limited access fishery and can even be strength-
ened by growing profits that eventually over-
whelm the positive but temporary economic
incentives created by buybacks. In short, buy-
backs create a window of opportunity to ratio-
nalize a fishery that erodes over time.
3. Buybacks are more effective at reducing fishing
capacity when fleets are smaller in number, the
fishery is well defined, fleet participants are
more homogeneous and the fishery is profitable.
All of these factors increase the incentives to
cooperate. Buybacks can become expensive and
costs rise over time as the fleet becomes smaller,
resource stocks recover and become more prof-
itable, and there is growing risk that their cost
can exceed the benefits gained.
4. Buybacks can be broad but shallow with
inclusive eligibility or narrower but deeper,
focusing on a particular group or fishery
segment. Every one of these choices is a
strategic choice that affects incentives and
hence behaviour, and shapes the type and
structure of the post-buyback fishery. Costs
and the buyback market are also affected by
the breadth and depth of the buyback.
5. Each buyback design has distributional impli-
cations, creating a strategic and distributional
choice, as well as being an issue for economic
efficiency. There may be equity–efficiency trade-
offs to consider. Buybacks that provide benefits
that are uneven throughout a community or
area may not necessarily restructure incentives
of all the players that are required to achieve
cooperation and the overall objective. Most
buybacks ignore crewmembers but a few offer
compensation to exiting crew. Remaining crew
can be expected to enjoy higher returns from a
more profitable fishery and the transfer of funds
to the fishery if a publically funded buyback.
6. Several preconditions are critical including boat
registration and limited access.
7. Buybacks work best through co-management,
which affects the strategic choice of the
programme design and participant incentives.
Stakeholder involvement in all phases from
programme design through to its execution
strengthens cooperation during the buyback
and in the subsequent restructured fishery.
8. Moral hazard and adverse selection arise due to
information asymmetry between the buyback
agency and fishers. Purchased vessels can be
‘lemons’, that is, older and less productive than
the remaining ones. Buybacks may accelerate
the departure of marginal vessels that would not
otherwise have left but at a higher purchase
price and with little improvement in economic
performance and stock recovery. By absorbing
risk and establishing a vessel or licence price
floor, thereby creating moral hazard, buybacks
may strengthen investment incentives for the
remaining vessels.
9. There is often no single best answer to many
programme design issues. Nonetheless, clear
objectives and a clearly defined scope of the
programme are critical. A pilot programme can
also be helpful. One or more champions can
play an important galvanizing force.
10. Decisions must be made to first purchase active
or inactive vessels and whether to purchase just
vessels or permits or both. No especially clear
answer to the sequence seems to exist, although
buying out inactive licences first, while the
fishery’s profitability is limited, may ultimately
prove more cost-effective. Otherwise, inactive
licence prices rise in value as the supply of
licences is reduced and any rising rents are
capitalized into licence prices.
11. Buyback beneficiaries can contribute to the
funding of the programme in all or in part.
Commercial fishers can enjoy increased profits,
recreational anglers can benefit from higher
catch rates, and the general public and NGOs
enjoy strengthened ecosystem health and biodi-
versity – non-market benefits from public goods.
The initial funding, especially for unprofitable
fisheries, may be government or an interna-
tional organization for transnational fisheries.
12. The net economic benefits of buybacks, partic-
ularly if public-funded, should be compared
with net benefits that could be generated by
these funds in their next best use elsewhere in
the economy, by the size of the benefits from the
buyback in comparison with the programme
expenditures and whether there are positive net
benefits to society and not just recipients. All of
these factors pertain to the size of the opportu-
nity cost.
13. Partial or completely private-financed buybacks
may be preferred to full public-financed buybacks
because the levy for private funding creates a
Pigovian tax that helps to correct the common
resource and public good externalities as well as
fund the buyback. Lump-sum Pigovian taxes do
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not alter fisher behaviour at themargin but taxes
on landings do. Depending on the incidence of
the tax between consumers and producers, there
may be incentives to curtail fish consumption as
consumers do not currently bear their share of
the full costs of fish consumption. Privately
financed buybacks force industry rather than
the public to bear any potential moral hazard, i.e.
risk and costs fromexpectations of future bailouts
and strengthened secondary markets and help
militate against expectations of future buybacks
that can lead to additional investment. Privately
financed buybacks are consistent with the con-
cept of beneficiary pays and are not a subsidy.
14. Buybacks can establish fixed prices or auctions.
Auction markets are more efficient in terms of
allocation and give greater cost-effectiveness
than markets with fixed prices established by
the buyback authority: when the authority has
little information about asset prices, the larger
the number of participants, the more heteroge-
neous the assets, and the more narrowly
focused the buyback programme objectives.
Bids can proceed in single round or multiple
rounds with advantages to each but are usually
multiple (sequential auctions) due to limited
budgets, although when bidders have the
opportunity to learn from preceding bidding
rounds, they will use that information to update
their bids and obtain higher prices, thereby
potentially lowering auction performance
through strategic behaviour. Bids are typically
first-price sealed bid reverse discriminatory
auctions, with prices often weighted on the
basis of one or more metrics, including price per
metre/estimated capacity/revenue/catch, some-
times by category of fleet or different bidding
pools. Eligibility requirements and bid discrim-
ination mechanisms, such as weights for differ-
ent criteria, are ex ante and ex post instruments
to determine bidding pools (fleet segments) and
implement fishery management objectives.
Irrevocable bids prevent speculation and penal-
ties-less option taking. Providing common infor-
mation helps form bids and market efficiency
but can allow for strategic behaviour from
bidders. Auction bids should be compared with
reservation prices established by the buyback
authority. When the price does not clear the
market with fixed price buybacks, the excess
quantity demanded or supplied requires a
rationing process based on some form of criteria
and weights for each criterion. Auctions entail
higher transactions costs and less transparency
than fixed price schemes, and upfront fixed costs
can deter fisher participation. The ultimate
purpose is to achieve the objectives at least
cost. In sum, the choice between fixed prices
and first-price sealed bid reverse discriminatory
auctions depends on circumstances, with the
latter generally more common and preferred
with sufficient numbers of participants; reser-
vation prices should be used with the latter.
15. Selective buybacks can help achieve social
objectives other than efficiency and resource
conservation goals including the accommoda-
tion of new entrants or coastal states, aboriginal
rights and shifting capacity regionally, by gear
or set type. These are effectively issues of
distribution. Funding for these objectives is
more complex than simply calling it undesirable
subsidies. Buybacks differentially impact gear
types or regions but maintaining an equitable
allocation of harvests among gear types or
regions helps ensure political support.
16. Buybacks increasingly address the under-supply
of public goods of ecosystem and biodiversity
health and the over-provision of their decline,
which can be labelled as public bads. Buybacks
can compensate fishers for loss of historical use
rights when they are no longer able to fish in
marine reserves for example, or they may com-
pensate fishers for methods that reduce bycatch.
The gains in non-market existence, option and
indirect use values must be weighed against the
opportunity cost of public funds used for financ-
ing, by the foregone use values for producer and
consumer surplus and whether compensated
vessels exit the fishery or merely fish elsewhere.
Public payments to increase the supply of public
goods or reduce public bads contribute to eco-
nomic efficiency as Pigovian subsidies and can be
viewed as increasing welfare and desirable.
Buybacks addressing public goods may require
ongoing benefits, either directly or for alternative
sources of livelihood or to compensate for
reduced benefits for fishing communities with
limited alternatives, especially in isolated or
developing areas.
17. Transnational buybacks require multilateral
cooperation and self-enforcement. Unilateral
buybacks face failure. New entrants and non-
participating free riders must be deterred and
compliance achieved, which requires changes
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in, at a minimum, customary international law
and requires credible trade and port measures
for enforcement. Allowing capacity to transfer
among individual owners rather than between
flag states increases efficiency (Hallman et al.
2010). Coastal states are typically accommo-
dated in initial allocations for growth, a side
payment from the future, and the resulting
overcapacity can be ameliorated through an
industry-financed landings tax that finances a
buyback. In some instances, publically financed
buybacks to address the transnational external-
ity with transboundary common resources and
public goods are called for, depending on
ownership of the property right.
18. Buybacks alone are not the long-term solution to
the overcapacity and the problem of overfishing
the commons in an open-access or limited access
fishery. But buybacks may be the best option for
transnational fisheries given the limitations of
international law for rights-based management
protected by a strong international treaty.
19. Buybacks address the capital stock and only
indirectly the relationship between inputs and
catches and capital and capacity utilization.
Unrestricted inputs can be substituted for
restricted inputs, capital and capacity utilization
can increase from fishing longer, and new
technology can be adopted. Vessel buybacks
unaccompanied by comprehensive use rights
generate incentives for continued investment,
overcapacity and overfishing, which are aggra-
vated by public financing. Such expansions
in investment and the use of inputs when
buybacks are unaccompanied by strong rights-
based management and governance would
have to be (imperfectly) countered by an ongo-
ing buyback.
20. Buybacks should be evaluated to identify les-
sons learned that help improve future pro-
grammes (GAO 2001).
Summary
Buybacks of vessels, licences, gear, access, and other
use and property rights can be a useful policy tool of
political economy under certain conditions and for a
limited time before the benefits erode. Buybacks are
not a narrow economic efficiency tool, panacea, or
long-term answer by themselves to the commons
problems of overcapacity and overfishing or to the
growing public bads problems of biodiversity loss
and ecosystem degradation. Buybacks are not a
first-best policy instrument. (A first-best policy is the
most economically efficient instrument that ad-
dresses the problem in question.) Instead, buybacks
can be viewed as a second-best policy and instru-
ment of political economy although there are first-
best exceptions such as the buying back of harmful
gear and its replacement with biodiversity friendly
gear (which addresses external benefits and under-
supply of public goods and over-supply of public
bads). Evaluating buybacks solely on narrow
grounds of economic efficiency and first-best policy
instruments blinds the user to their potential
applicability as a tool of political economy facilitat-
ing the realities of implementing accompanying
rights-based management and changing behaviour
from non-cooperative to cooperative. These are the
reasons that buybacks are widely used prior to
implementation of rights-based management and
the conservation of environmental public goods and
where public financing is justified on social or
economic grounds.
Buybacks are widely used for reasons of political
economy and given this orientation the focus of this
study is largely on the most economically favour-
able conditions for their use. Once chosen as a
course of action, how can buybacks be most
effectively designed and implemented? Although
buybacks are decidedly a second-best policy on the
basis of strict economic efficiency, they may be one
of the only feasible options for transnational and
some other fisheries or for social issues such as
compensation, disaster relief, aboriginal rights, and
distributional issues and public goods. These are all
areas where traditional first-best economic policy
instruments have less sway.
Notably, buybacks create a window of opportu-
nity that can provide a limited period of transition to
a rationalized fishery based on rights-based man-
agement and improved private and public gover-
nance, as in Australia, New Zealand, and parts of
the USA. Rights can be individual or group and on
catch or fishing effort. Even after strong rights-based
management with improved governance or other
policies have been instituted, buybacks can facilitate
exit from the fishery that has become sluggish or
correct for allocation conflicts, as in Australia and
Iceland. At a minimum, a buyback needs to be
coupled with limited access, the scrapping of pur-
chased vessels, limits on reentry through purchases
of formerly inactive licences by owners who have
just sold an active licence or reinvestment in the
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capital stock, co-management through partnership
with industry and effective management of the
fishery. Private financing is preferred, possibly kick-
started through a public loan, and can provide a
‘double-dividend’ Pigovian tax preferably set at the
margin.
Buybacks by themselves do not resolve the
inconsistency between private fisher incentives
and social objectives created by incomplete use or
property rights, public goods, inadequate gover-
nance, uncertainty and other factors. Simply put
buybacks do not directly address these root causes of
the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ and without other-
wise concomitantly addressing these root causes
buybacks can even aggravate the situation.
Gains from buybacks alone are transitory. Unless
specific steps are taken previously inactive or low
activity vessels and permits will activate, investment
will continue, new technology will be adopted and
the gains from the buyback will erode. Continuous,
ongoing buybacks (or other, complementary pay-
ments) and automatic attrition through reductions
in some specified amount of vessel capacity units
with every vessel transfer would need to be a
permanent feature. However, such continuous
structural adjustment inevitably fails to counter
the ongoing increases in fishing capacity as fishers
invest in their capital stock, increase capital and
capacity utilization by fishing longer, and adopt new
technology driven by the incentives of incomplete
property and use rights, inadequate governance and
uncertainty over the longer term.
In principle, private and public benefits com-
bined should be weighed against the opportunity
cost associated with the alternative use of funds
and any deadweight losses from taxes not specif-
ically levied to finance the programme to determine
whether or not there will be a positive net
economic benefit to society. Such a cost–benefit
assessment would have to be conducted in con-
junction with any complementary conservation
and management measures that are undertaken,
such as the introduction of rights-based manage-
ment or marine reserves.
In sum, buybacks by themselves are not usually a
first-best policy or a cost-effective way to rationalize
a fishery, and by themselves they fail to rationalize a
fishery over a longer time period because they do
not address the underlying root causes of the
commons problem or the collective action problem
and under-provision with public goods. Instead,
buybacks largely provide a second-best policy and
instrument of political economy for the fishery
manager that creates a window of opportunity to
pave the way to individual or group rights on
catches or effort, strengthened governance, marine
reserves, ecosystem management and strengthened
marine biodiversity. Publically funded buybacks for
public goods issues address under-supply and are a
Pigovian subsidy accounting for external benefits
and free riding, not a ‘bad’ subsidy (but might not
necessarily be first-best policy). Privately financed
buybacks are not a subsidy but instead institute a
‘double dividend’ Pigovian tax through the levy,
which give an extra boost towards solving the
commons problem. Care, especially through auction
design and private financing (except with public
goods and social issues), has to be given to limit
problems of asymmetric information – adverse
selection and ‘lemons’ and moral hazard. Truly
effective buybacks with an objective other than
outright distributional issues and transfer payments
have to be strictly coupled with a broader manage-
ment objective that addresses best use of common
resources and public goods and the root causes of
their misuse and economic inefficiency. Buybacks
should not be implemented or evaluated as a policy
instrument in isolation.
Acknowledgements
The results are not necessarily those of NOAA
Fisheries. The author is grateful to discussions and
paper authors at the 2004 international buyback
workshop participants at the University of California
San Diego, to the participants at the 2009 Brussels,
Seas at Risk Conference, ‘Towards Sustainable
European Fisheries’, and to countless fishers and
fishery managers of the Pacific Fisheries Manage-
ment Council (especially Dick Young and Pete
Leipzig), who imparted a very real appreciation for
second-best policy and for the practical realities of
political economy and organizing and motivating
people in fisheries conservation and management
that are not captured by economic models. All
errors and conclusions remain those of the author.
References
Athey, S., Levin, J. and Seira, E. (2004) Comparing Open and
Sealed Bid Auctions: Theory and Evidence From Timber
Auctions. Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milan, Italy.
Barlow, J., Rojas-Bracho, L., Mun˜oz-Pin˜a, C. and Mesnick,
S. (2010) Conservation of the Vaquita (Phocoena sinus)
A review of fisheries buybacks D Squires
384  2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd, F I SH and F I SHERIES , 11, 366–387
in the Northern Gulf of California, Mexico. Chapter 15.
In: Handbook of Marine Fisheries Conservation and
Management (eds R.Q. Grafton, R. Hilborn, D. Squires,
M. Tait and M. Williams). Oxford University Press,
Oxford, UK, pp. 205–214.
Barrett, S. (2003) Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy
of Environmental Treaty-Making. Oxford University Press,
Oxford, UK.
Bustic, V. and Bromley, D.W. (2006) Purchasing a Way of
Life: Do Fisheries Buyout Programs Work?Working paper,
Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics,
University of Madison, Wisconsin.
Campbell, H. (1989) Fishery buy-back programs and
economic welfare. Australian Journal of Agricultural
Economics 33, 20–31.
Campbell, H. and Lindner, R.K. (1990) The production of
fishing effort and the economic performance of license
limitation programs. Land Economics 66, 56–67.
Clark, C.W., Munro, G. and Sumaila, U. (2005) Subsidies,
buybacks, and sustainable fisheries. Journal of Environ-
mental Economics and Management 50, 47–58.
Clark, C.W., Munro, G. and Sumaila, U. (2007) Buyback
subsidies, the time consistency problem and the ITQ
alternative. Land Economics 83, 50–58.
Cueff, J.C. (2007) A case study of fishing vessel capacity
management public buy-out schemes: community
experience through the multi-annual guidance pro-
grammes and ways forward. Chapter 5. In: Fisheries
Buybacks (eds R. Curtis and D. Squires). Wiley-Black-
well, Ames, IA., pp. 75–80.
Cunningham, S. and Greboval, D. (2001)Managing Fishing
Capacity: A Review of Policy and Technical Issues. FAO
Fisheries Technical Paper No. 409, Rome.
Curtis, R. and Squires, D. (2007) Fisheries Buybacks.
Blackwell Publishers, Ames, IA.
Fox, K., Grafton, R.Q., Kompas, T. and Che, T. (2007)
Capacity reduction and productivity: a case study of the
Australian south east trawl fishery. Chapter 4. In:
Fisheries Buybacks (eds R. Curtis and D. Squires). Wiley-
Blackwell, Ames, IA., pp. 67–74.
GAO (US Government Accounting Office) (2001) Com-
mercial fisheries: the effectiveness of fishing buyback
programs can be improved. Testimony before the
Subcommittee on Fisheries Conservation, Wildlife, and
Oceans, Committee on Resources, U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives, 10 May 2001. Available at: http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d01699t.pdf. (last accessed
24 March 2010.)
Grafton, R.Q. and Nelson, H. (2007) The effects of buy-
back programs in the British Columbia salmon fishery.
Chapter 12. In: Fisheries Buybacks (eds R. Curtis and D.
Squires). Wiley-Blackwell, Ames, IA., pp. 191–202.
Groves, T. and Squires, D. (2007) Lessons from fisheries
buybacks. Chapter 2. In: Fisheries Buybacks (eds R. Curtis
and D. Squires). Wiley-Blackwell, Ames, IA.
Guyader, O., Berthou, P. and Daure`s, F. (2007) Decom-
missioning schemes and capacity adjustment: a pre-
liminary analysis of the French experience. Chapter 7.
In: Fisheries Buybacks (eds R. Curtis and D. Squires).
Wiley-Blackwell, Ames, IA., pp. 105–132.
Hallman, B., Barrett, S., Clarke, R.P., Joseph, J. and
Squires, D. (2010) Limited access in transnational tuna
fisheries. Chapter 12. In: Conservation and Management of
Transnational Tuna Fisheries (eds R. Allen, J. Joseph and
D. Squires). Wiley-Blackwell, Ames, IA., pp. 195–214.
Hannesson, R. (2007a) Buyback programs for fishing
vessels in Norway. Chapter 11. In: Fisheries Buybacks
(eds R. Curtis and D. Squires). Wiley-Blackwell, Ames,
IA., pp. 55–66.
Hannesson, R. (2007b) Do buyback programs make
sense?. Chapter 3. In: Fisheries Buybacks (eds R. Curtis
and D. Squires). Wiley-Blackwell, Ames, IA., pp. 177–
190.
Holland, D., Gudmundsson, E. and Gates, J. (1999) Do
fishing vessel buyback programs work: a survey of the
evidence. Marine Policy 23, 47–69.
Kirkley, J. and Squires, D. (1988) A limited information
approach for determining capital stock and investment
in a fishery. Fishery Bulletin 86, 339–349.
Kirkley, J., Walden, J. and Waters, J. (2007) Buyback
programs and industry restructuring in fisheries.
Chapter 15. In: Fisheries Buybacks (eds R. Curtis and
D. Squires). Wiley-Blackwell, Ames, IA., pp. 227–238.
Kitts, A., Thunberg, E. and Robertson, J. (2001) Willing-
ness to participate and bids in a fishing vessel buyout
program: a case study of New England groundfish.
Marine Resource Economics 15, 221–232.
Klemperer, P. (2004) Auctions: Theory and Practice. Prince-
ton University. Available at: http://www.paulklemperer.
org/.
Kuronuma, Y. (1997) Japan: Part II. An economic theory
behind the Japanese coastal fisheries management policy
on fishing rights in relation to the license system for
off-shore and distant-water fisheries. In: Towards Sustain-
able Fisheries: Issue Papers. Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development, Paris, France.
Latacz-Lohmann, U. and Schilizzi, S. (2005) Auctions for
Conservation Contracts: A Review of the Theoretical and
Empirical Literature. Report to the Scottish Executive
Environment and Rural Affairs Department, October,
Edinburgh.
Lindebo, E. and Vestergaard, N. (2007) Vessel decommis-
sioning in Danish fisheries. Chapter 6. In: Fisheries
Buybacks (eds R. Curtis and D. Squires). Wiley-Blackwell,
Ames, IA., pp. 81–104.
Martell, S., Walters, C. and Sumaila, R. (2009) Industry-
funded fishing license reduction good for profits and
conservation. Fish and Fisheries 10, 1–12.
Mas-Colell, A., Whinston, M. and Green, J. (1995)
Microeconomic Theory. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
A review of fisheries buybacks D Squires
 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd, F I SH and F I SHERIES , 11, 366–387 385
Milgrom, P. (2004) Putting Auction Theory to Work.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Nautilus Consultants (1997) The Economic Evaluation of the
Fishing Boats (Decommissioning) Schemes. Nautilus Con-
sultants, Edinburgh, UK.
Newby, J., Goday, P. and Elliston, L. (2004) Structural
Adjustment in Australian Fisheries. Report prepared for
the Fisheries Resources Research Fund, ABARE eReport
04.17, Canberra, Australia.
Niesten, E. and Gjertsen, H. (2009) Incentives in Marine
Conservation Approaches: Comparing Buyouts, Incentive
Agreements, and Alternative Livelihoods. Conservation
International, Washington, DC.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) (2009) Reducing Fishing Capacity: Best
Practices for Decommissioning Schemes. OECD, Paris,
France.
Read, A.G. and Buck, E.H. (1997) Commercial Fishing:
Economic Aid and Capacity Reduction. CRS Report for
Congress. Congressional Research Service, Washington,
DC. Available at: http://www.cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/
Marine/mar-24.cfm.
Riechers, R., Griffin, W. and Woodward, R. (2007) The
Texas inshore bay and bait license buyback program.
Chapter 14. In: Fisheries Buybacks (eds R. Curtis and D.
Squires). Wiley-Blackwell, Ames, IA., pp. 215–226.
Spagnolo, M. (2007) The decommissioning scheme for the
Italian clam fishery: a case of success. Chapter 8. In:
Fisheries Buybacks (eds R. Curtis and D. Squires). Wiley-
Blackwell, Ames, IA., pp. 133–144.
Spagnolo, M. and Sabatella, R. (2007a) Driftnets buyback
program: a case of institutional failure. Chapter 9. In:
Fisheries Buybacks (eds R. Curtis and D. Squires). Wiley-
Blackwell, Ames, IA., pp. 145–156.
Spagnolo, M. and Sabatella, E. (2007b) The impact of the
EU buyback scheme on the Italian fleet: The Northern
and Central Adriatic sea bottom trawlers case. Chapter
10. In: Fisheries Buybacks (eds R. Curtis and D. Squires).
Wiley-Blackwell, Ames, IA., pp. 157–176.
Squires, D., Joseph, J. and Groves, T. (2006) Buybacks in
transnational fisheries. Pacific Economic Bulletin 21, 63–
74.
Squires, D., Groves, T., Grafton, Q., Curtis, R., Joseph, J.
and Allen, R. (2010) Fisheries buybacks. Chapter 39. In:
Handbook of Marine Fisheries Conservation and Manage-
ment (eds R.Q. Grafton, R. Hilborn, D. Squires, M. Tait
and M. Williams). Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
Sun, C.-H. (2007) Effectiveness of vessel buyback programs
on the offshore fishery in Taiwan. Chapter 13. In:
Fisheries Buybacks (eds R. Curtis and D. Squires). Wiley-
Blackwell, Ames, IA., pp. 203–214.
Thunberg, E., Kitts, A. and Walden, J. (2007) A case study
of New England groundfish fishing capacity reduction.
Chapter 16. In: Fisheries Buybacks (eds R. Curtis and D.
Squires). Wiley-Blackwell, Ames, IA., pp. 239–248.
Vestergaard, N. (2010) Principal-agent problems in fish-
eries. Chapter 42. In: Handbook of Marine Fisheries
Conservation and Management (eds R.Q. Grafton, R.
Hilborn, D. Squires, M. Tait and M. Williams). Oxford
University Press, Oxford., pp. 563–571.
Weninger, Q. and McConnell, K.E. (2000) Buyback
programs in commercial fisheries: efficiency versus
transfers. Canadian Journal of Economics 33, 394–412.
Whitford, A. (2007) Designing markets: why competitive
bidding and auctions in government often fail to deliver.
The Policy Studies Journals 35, 61–85.
Woodrow, M. (1998) A case study of fisheries reduction
programs during the Northern Cod Moratorium. Ocean
and Coastal Management 39, 105–118.
World Bank (2004) Saving Fish and Fisheries: Towards
Sustainable and Equitable Governance of the Global Fishing
Sector. Report No. 29090-GLB, Agriculture and Rural
Development Department. World Bank, Washington,
DC.
Appendix: Asymmetric information, moral
hazard, adverse selection and lemons
Asymmetric information arises when parties to a
transaction hold differing quantities and quality of
information. The principal–agent problem arises
when a principal, such as the buyback authority,
compensates an agent, such as the vessel owner, for
performing certain acts that are useful to the princi-
pal and costly to the vessel owner, and where there
are elements of the performance that are costly to
observe.
Moral hazard is a special case of the problem of
asymmetric information, whereby the actions of one
party to a transaction are unobservable, so that one
party in a transaction has more information than
another (Mas-Colell et al. 1995). There are incen-
tives to evade contract requirements or to ‘cheat’.
Moral hazard occurs when a party shielded from
risk may behave differently than it would behave if
it was fully exposed to the risk. The party that is
insulated from risk generally has more information
about its actions and intentions than the party
paying for the negative consequences of the risk.
More broadly, moral hazard occurs when the party
with more information about its actions or inten-
tions has a tendency or incentive to behave inap-
propriately from the perspective of the party with
less information.
Adverse selection arises when an informed indi-
vidual’s trading decisions depend on that individ-
ual’s privately held information in a manner that
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adversely affects uninformed market participants
(Mas-Colell et al. 1995). In a vessel-buyback
market, a vessel owner is more likely to decide to
sell the vessel when that owner knows that the
vessel is not very good, when it is often what is
called a ‘lemon’. In short, there is an incentive for
owners of ‘lemons’ to sell. When adverse selection is
present, uninformed traders, such as buyback
agencies, may be more wary of any informed trader
wishing to sell and the agency’s willingness to pay
for the vessel or permit offered may be lower.
There are ‘good’ used vessels and ‘defective’ used
vessels (‘lemons’), but because of asymmetric infor-
mation about the vessel, the seller knows much
more about the problems of the vessel than does the
buyer. Accordingly, the buyer’s best guess for a
given vessel is that the vessel is of average quality;
as such, the buyer will be willing only to pay for a
vessel of known average quality. This means that
the owner of a ‘good’ used vessel will be unable to
get a high enough price to make selling that ‘vessel’
worthwhile. Therefore, owners of ‘good’ vessels are
less likely to place their vessels on the buyback
market. This is sometimes summarized as ‘the bad
driving out the good’ in the market.
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